Indian Philosophy - Non Vedic schools II
(Complementary)

BA DEGREE PROGRAMME
SEMIESTER- IV

CUCBCSS
2014 Admission onwards

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT
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2
Indian Philosophy - Non Vedic schools II (Complementary)

Indian philosophy is mainly divided into nine categories i.e. Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Vedanta, Jainism, Buddhism and Lokayata. These nine systems of Indian Philosophical thought have been conventionally classified into two broad divisions of the orthodox (astika) and the heterodox (nastika). This classification has been made on the basis of whether or not a system accepts the infallibility of Vedas. The Schools that neither consider the Vedas to neither be infallible nor derive their own validity from the authority of the Vedas are classified as heterodox, or nastika. The schools of Lokayata or Carvaka, Buddhism, and Jainism, fall in this category as they rejected the authority of the Vedas. The Buddhists and the Jainas subscribed to their own respective scriptures. The remaining six Schools are all orthodox because, directly or indirectly, they accept the authority of the Vedas. Of these, Mimamsa and Vedanta depend entirely on the Vedas and exist in continuation of the Vedic tradition. Mimamsa emphasizes the importance of the rituals prescribed in the Vedas, but Vedanta considers the parts of Vedas which contain philosophical issues more important. While Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, and Vaisesika are not based on the Vedas, they accept the authority of the Vedas. Thus the schools of Lokayata or Carvaka, Buddhism, and Jainism are considered as the non vedic or materialist philosophies in Indian culture.

Lokayata or Carvaka Philosophy

The founder of the Lokayata philosophy is said to be Brhaspati, and sometimes Lokayata is also called Barhaspatya related with the name of its founder. This School is also called as the foundation of Indian Materialism. As the name itself suggests, this school believes matter to be the only reality. The materialists accept the existence of only four eternal elements - earth, water, fire and air. They reduce everything to matter and explain even metaphysical concepts like consciousness as a property, which is produced in the body from a combination of these four elements in a certain proportion. Their whole philosophy rests on their theory of knowledge, which admits perception as the only source of valid knowledge. Consequently, they do not entertain the ideas of God, Soul, and the like, as these cannot be ascertained by perception. The Carvaka ethics leave a lot to be desired. Since they take this world to be the only reality, never to be experienced again once we die, they believe in maximum indulgence of
senses. As a result of the strongest opponent of vedic rituals and philosophical systems, no original work of the system has survived.

The etymology of Carvaka is uncertain. Some believe it to mean "agreeable speech" or pejoratively, "sweet-tongued" (cāru "agreeable" and vāk "speech"). Others contend that it derives from the root charv meaning to eat possibly alluding to the philosophy's hedonistic precepts of "eat, drink, and be merry". Yet another theory believes it to be eponymous in origin, with the founder of the school being Charvaka, a disciple of Brhaspati. Bhattacharya notes that the word Charvaka is of irregular construction, as cara as an adjective means "agreeable, pleasant", but as a noun is another name of Brihaspati, and both derivations are plausible. According to Debiprasad Chattopadhaya, the traditional name of Charvaka is Lokayata. It was called Lokayata because it was prevalent (ayatah) among the people (lokesu), and meant the world-outlook of the people. The dictionary meaning of Lokāyata signifies "directed towards, aiming at the world, worldly". In the first half of the 20th century literature, the etymology of Lokayata has been given different interpretations, in part because the primary sources are unavailable, and the meaning has been deduced from divergent secondary literature. The name Lokāyata, for example, is found in Arthasastra of Chanakya which refers to three Anvishikis i.e. Yoga, Sankhya and Lokāyata.

No original work of this school is extant with the single exception of a much later work, Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarashi Bhatta, published by the Oriental Institute of Baroda in 1940. It is therefore very difficult to have a correct idea of it. Out chief sources of information are given in the works of the other schools. But this is done only to refute materialism. Thus we find the tenets of materialism often misrepresented. The weak points in this school are exaggerated and the strong points are omitted. So we get only a faint caricature and not a true picture. The Sarva-darshana-sangraha gives a summary of this school, but that too seems to be based on such accounts. It is indeed very difficult to believe that materialism which is allowed the status of an independent school of Indian Philosophy should really be so crude and degenerate as it is painted. But in the absence of the original works, we have to remain satisfied with these meager and one-sided accounts.
Extracts and citations on the concepts of Lokayata from various philosophical scriptures give some incomplete information about the philosophy of Lokayata. Most of these citations are made by the strong opponents of this philosophy to reject its views. So the reconstruction of the concepts of Loayata philosophy from these quotations needs more attention. Some of them are as follows:

1 Earth, water fire and air are the elements.
(Prthviaptejovuriti tattvani)

2 Bodies, senses and objects are the results of the different combination of elements.
(tatsamudaye sarirendriyavisayasamjna.)

3 Consciousness arises from matter like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fer mented yeast
(Kinvadibhyo madasaktivad vijnanam)

4 The soul is nothing but the conscious body
(Chaitanyavisistah Purusah)

5 Enjoyment is the only end of human life.
(Kama evaikah purusarthah.)

6 Death alone is liberation.
(maranaevapavargah)

The Sarva-darshana-sangraha gives the following summary of the carvaka position:
'There is not heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world; nor do the action of the four castes, orders etc, produce any real effect. The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves and smearing one's self with ashes, were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness. If a beast slain in the Jyotistoma rite will itself go to heaven, why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?... If beings in heaven are gratified by out offering the Shraddha here, then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the house top? While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee (clarified butter) even though he runs in debt; when once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return here?
`Yavajjivet sukham jivet
Rnamkrtva ghrtam pibet
Bhasmibhutasya dehasya
Punaragamanam kutah?`

(All the ceremonies are) a means of livelihood (for) Brahmans. The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves and demons'.

`Trayivedasyakartaro bhanda dhurtta nisacarah`

The Carvaka school considers perception (pratyaksa) as the only reliable source of knowledge. Carvaka epistemology holds perception as the primary and proper source of knowledge, while inference is held as prone to being either right or wrong and therefore conditional or invalid. Perceptions are of two types, for Carvaka, external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind. Inference (anumana) is described as deriving a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths. To Carvakas, inference is useful but prone to error, as inferred truths can never be without doubt. Inference is good and helpful; it is the validity of inference that is suspect – sometimes in certain cases and often in others. To the Carvakas there were no reliable means by which the efficacy of inference as a means of knowledge could be established.

But can we not regard the testimony of competent persons as a valid and safe source of knowledge? Do we not very often act on knowledge received from authority? The Carvaka replies that testimony consists of words (sabda). So far as words are heard through our ears, they are perceived. Knowledge of words is, therefore, knowledge through perception and is quite valid. But in so far as these words suggest or mean things not within our perception, and aim at giving us knowledge of those unperceived objects, they are not free from error and doubt. Very often we are misled by so-called authority. The authority of the Vedas, for example, is held in high esteem by many. But in reality the Vedas are the works of some cunning priests who earned their living by duping the ignorant and the credulous. With false hopes and promises the Vedas persuade men to perform Vedic rites, the only tangible benefit
of which goes to the priests who officiate and enjoy the emoluments. But will not our knowledge to extremely limited and practical life sometimes impossible, if we do not accept the words of the experienced and do not depend on expert advice? The Carvaka reply is that in so far as we depend on any authority, because we think it to be reliable, the knowledge obtained is really based on inference; because our belief is generated by a mental process like this: This authority should be accepted because it is reliable, and all reliable authority should be accepted. Being based on inference, knowledge, derived from verbal testimony or authority is as precarious as inference. And as in the case of inference, here we often act on knowledge derived from authority on the wrong belief that it is reliable. Sometimes this belief accidentally leads to successful results, sometimes it does not. Therefore, authority or testimony cannot be regarded as a safe and valid source of knowledge. As neither Inference nor authority can be proved to be reliable, Perception must be regarded as the only valid source of knowledge.

**Jaina Philosophy**

Jainism is properly the name of one of the heterodox schools that have their origin in the history of Indian philosophy. According to its own traditions, the teachings of Jainism are eternal, and hence have no founder; however, the Jainism of this age can be traced back to Mahavira, a teacher of the sixth century BCE, a contemporary of the Buddha. Like those of the Buddha, Mahavira’s doctrines were formulated as a reaction to and rejection of the Brahmanism (religion based on the Hindu scriptures, the Vedas and Upanisads) then taking shape. The brahmans taught the division of society into rigidly delineated castes, and a doctrine of reincarnation guided by karma, or merit brought about by the moral qualities of actions.

The Word Jainism is derived from 'Jina' which means 'conqueror' one who has conquered his passions and desires. It is applied to the liberated souls who have conquered passions and desires and karmas and obtained emancipation. The Jainas believe in 24 Tirthankaras or 'Founders of the Faith' through whom their faith has come down from fabulous antiquity. Of these, the first was Rshabhaveda and the last, Mahavira, the great spiritual hero, whose name was Vardhamana Mahavira, the last of the prophets, cannot be regarded as the founder of Jainism, because even before him, Jaina teachings were existent. But Mahavira gave a new orientation to that faith and for all practical purposes, modern Jainism may be rightly
regarded as a result of his teachings. His predecessor, the 3rd Tirthankara, Parshvanatha is also a historical personage who lived in the eighth or ninth century B.C.

According to Jain thought, the basic constituents of reality are souls (jīva), matter (pudgala), motion (dharma), rest (adharma), space (akasa), and time (kala). Space is understood to be infinite in all directions, but not all of space is habitable. A finite region of space, usually described as taking the shape of a standing man with arms akimbo, is the only region of space that can contain anything. This is so because it is the only region of space that is pervaded with dharma, the principle of motion (adharma is not simply the absence of dharma, but rather a principle that causes objects to stop moving). The physical world resides in the narrow part of the middle of inhabitable space. The rest of the inhabitable universe may contain gods or other spirits.

While Jainism is dualistic—that is, matter and souls are thought to be entirely different types of substance—it is frequently said to be atheistic. What is denied is a creator god above all. The universe is eternal, matter and souls being equally uncreated. The universe contains gods who may be worshipped for various reasons, but there is no being outside it exercising control over it. The gods and other superhuman beings are all just as subject to karma and rebirth as human beings are. By their actions, souls accumulate karma, which is understood to be a kind of matter, and that accumulation draws them back into a body after death. Hence, all souls have undergone an infinite number of previous lives, and—with the exception of those who win release from the bondage of karma—will continue to reincarnate, each new life determined by the kind and amount of karma accumulated. Release is achieved by purging the soul of all karma, good and bad.

Every living thing has a soul, so every living thing can be harmed or helped. For purposes of assessing the worth of actions, living things are classified in a hierarchy according to the kinds of senses they have; the more senses a being has, the more ways it can be harmed or helped. Plants, various one-celled animals, and 'elemental' beings (beings made of one of the four elements—earth, air, fire, or water) have only one sense, the sense of touch. Worms and many insects have the senses of touch and taste. Other insects, like ants and lice, have those two senses plus the sense of smell. Flies and bees, along with other higher insects, also have
sight. Human beings, along with birds, fish, and most terrestrial animals, have all five senses. This complete set of senses makes all kinds of knowledge available to human beings, including knowledge of the human condition and the need for liberation from rebirth.

The Jainas classify knowledge into immediate (aparoksa) and mediate (paroksa). Immediate knowledge is further divided into Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala; and mediate knowledge into Mati and shruta. Perceptual knowledge which is ordinarily called immediate, is admitted to be relatively so by Jainism and therefore included in mediate and not immediate knowledge. It is included under Mati. Pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot rank the title of knowledge. It must be given meaning and arranged into order by conception or thought. Perceptual knowledge therefore is regarded as mediate since it presupposes the activity of thought. Mati includes both perceptual and inferential knowledge. sruta means knowledge derived from authority. Thus Mati and sruta which are the two kinds of mediate knowledge have as their instruments perception, inference an authority, the three Pramanas admitted by Jainism. Avadhijnana, Manahparyaya jnanana and Kevala jnana are the three kinds of immediate knowledge which may be called extra- ordinary and extra-sensory perceptions. Avadhi is clairvoyance; Manahparyaya is telepathy; and Kevala is omniscience. Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space or time. It is called Avadhi or 'limited' because it functions within a particular area and up to a particular time. It cannot go beyond spatial and temporal limits. Manahparyaya is direct knowledge of the thoughts of others. This too is limited by spatial and temporal conditions. In both Avadhi and Manahparyaya, the soul has direct knowledge unaided by the senses or the mind. Hence they are called immediate, though limited. Kevala - Jnana is unlimited and absolute knowledge. It can be acquired only by the liberated souls. It is not limited by space, time or object. Besides these five kinds of right knowledge, we have three kinds of wrong knowledge - Samsaya or doubt, Viparyaya or mistake and Anadhyavasaya or wrong knowledge through indifference.

Underlying Jain epistemology is the idea that reality is multifaceted (anekanta, or 'non-one-sided'), such that no one view can capture it in its entirety; that is, no single statement or set of statements captures the complete truth about the objects they describe. This insight, illustrated by the famous story of the blind men trying to describe an elephant, grounds both a
kind of fallibilism in epistemology and a sevenfold classification of statements in logic. The Jain list of pramanas includes sense perception, valid testimony (not vedic), extra-sensory perception, telepathy, and kevala, the state of omniscience of a perfected soul. Notably absent from the list is inference, which most other Indian schools include, but Jain discussion of the pramanas seem to indicate that inference is included by implication in the pramana that provides the premises for inference. That is, inference from things learned by the senses is itself knowledge gained from the senses; inference from knowledge gained by testimony is itself knowledge gained by testimony, etc. Later Jain thinkers would add inference as a separate category, along with memory and tarka, the faculty by which we recognize logical relations.

Jainism emphatically asserts that every soul is capable of attaining perfection if it willfully exerts in that direction. But the real situation is that from time eternal the soul is bound with matter and it is the aim of every person to get the soul rid of matter so that soul can assume its true state. This spiritual emancipation requires the knowledge of the beatific condition and of the causes which stand in the way of its attainment. To find out these causes it is necessary to understand what are the existing elements or substances of nature and mode of their interaction. Jainism believes that the whole universe can be divided into two categories, viz., Jiva, i.e., soul and Ajiva, i.e. non-soul. These two - Jiva and Ajiva - exhaust between them all that exists in the universe and Jaina philosophy is based on the nature and interaction of these two elements. It can be said in short that the living and the non-living, by coming into contact with each other, forge certain energies which bring about birth, death and various experiences of life; this process could be stopped, and the energies already forged destroyed, by a course of discipline leading to salvation.

A close analysis of this brief statement shows that it involves following seven propositions.

1. Firstly, that there is something called the living.
2. Secondly, that there is something called the nonliving.
3. Thirdly, that the two (i.e. the living and nonliving) come into contact with each other.
4. Fourthly, that the contact leads to the production of some energies.
5. Fifthly, that the process of this contact could be stopped.
6. Sixthly, that the existing energies could also be exhausted; and
7. Lastly, that salvation could be achieved.

These seven propositions are called the seven tattvas or realities in Jainism.

These seven tattvas are termed as follows:

1. Jiva (i.e. Living substance)
2. Ajiva (i.e. matter or non-living substance)
3. Asrava (i.e., the influx of Karmic matter in the soul
4. Bandha (i.e., bondage of soul by Karmic matter)
5. Samvara (i.e., the stopping of Asrava)
6. Nirjara (i.e., the gradual removal of Karmic matter).
7. Moksha (i.e., the attainment of perfect freedom or salvation).

Syadvada

Syadvada holds all knowledge to be only probable. Every proposition given us only a perhaps, a may be or a syad. We cannot affirm or deny anything absolutely of any object. There is nothing certain on account of the endless complexity of things. It emphasises the extremely complex nature of reality and its indefiniteness. It does not deny the possibility of predication, though it disallows absolute or categorical predication. The dynamic character of reality can consist only with relative or conditional predication. Every proposition is true, but only under certain condition i.e. hypothetically. It holds that there are seven different ways of speaking of thing or its attributes, according to the point of view. There is a point of view from which substance or attribute (1) is, (2) is not, (3) is and is not, (4) is unpredictable, (5) is and is unpredictable, (6) is not and is unpredictable, and (7) is, is not and is unpredictable.

1. Syadasti. From the point of view of its own material, place, time and nature, a thing is i.e. exists as itself. The jar exists as made of clay, in my room at the present moments, of such and such a shape and size.
2. Syadnasti. From the point of view of the material, place, time and nature of another thing, a thing is not, i.e., it is not nothing. The jar does not exist as made of metal, at a different place or time or if a different shape and size.

3. Syadasti nasti. From the point of view of the same quaternary, relating to itself and another thing, it may be said that a thing is and is not. In a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain sense it does not. We say here what a thing is as well as what it is not.

4. Syad avaktavyam. While in three we make statements that a thing is in its own self and is not, as another successively, it becomes impossible to make these statements at once. In this sense a thing is unpredictable. Though the presence of its own nature and the absence of other -nature are both together in the jar, still we cannot express them.

5. Syadasti avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own quaternary and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and nothing, a thing is and is unpredictable. We note both the existence of a thing and its indescribability.

6. Syad nasti avatavyam. From the point of view of the quaternary of the nothing and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and nothing, a thing is not and is also unpredictable. We note here what thing is not as well as its indescribability.

7. Syad asti nasti avaktavyam. From the point of view of its own quaternary as well as that of nothing and at the same time from the joint quaternary of itself and nothing, a thing is, is not and is indescribable. We bring out the inexpressibly of a thing as well as it is and what it is not.

Of these possible ways of speaking about a thing or its attributes, the first two are the chief, the simple affirmative that a thing is in its svarupa (own form), svadravya (own matter), svaksetra (own place), and svakala (own time), and the simple negative that a thing is not in its pararupa (other form), paradravya (other matter), paraksetra (other place), and parakala (other time). The latter is the negative fact. This doctrine insists on the correlativity of affirmation and negation. All judgments are double edged in their character. All things are existent as well as nonexistent. This is the theory of syadavada given by Jaina.

**Buddhism**

Buddhism is considered as one of the great contributions of ancient India to the history of world philosophy. It was in the sixth century B.C. that the world saw the Light of Asia, that
perfect embodiment of knowledge, courage, love and sacrifice whose heart overflowed with purest emotion on seeing that human life was essentially fraught with misery and pain, that a shallow optimism was rooted in a deep pessimism, that behind the superficial momentary glow of sensual pleasure there lay the misery of old age, sickness and death; who, moved by that spectacle to seek a remedy for men’s ills, at the age of twenty-nine, boldly left not only the material luxuries of the Shakya kingdom but also his beloved new-born son, at last found enlightenment as he lay emaciated under a tree near Gaya, dispelling the dark clouds of ignorance and conquering Mara, the Prince of Evil; who then preached the truth he had discovered without distinction of caste, creed or color. Thus Buddha taught. And Buddhism was embraced by the rich and poor, the high and the low, the intellectual and the dull alike. The basic scriptures of Buddhism are the Tripitakas (Pali: Tipitaka), or three baskets: The three sections of the canon are the Vinaya Pitaka (the monastic law), the Sutta Pitaka (words of the Buddha), and the Abhidamma Pitaka (the philosophical commentaries).

Early Buddhism remained centered on the Ganges valley, spreading gradually from its ancient heartland. The canonical sources record two councils, where the monastic Sangha established the textual collections based on the Buddha's teachings and settled certain disciplinary problems within the community. The first Buddhist council was held just after Buddha's Parinirvana, and presided over by Gupta Mahakasyapa, one of his most senior disciples, at Rajagrha during the 5th century under the noble support of king Ajathasatru. The objective of the council was to record all of Buddha's teachings into the doctrinal teachings (sutra) and Abhidhamma and to codify the monastic rules (vinaya). Ananda, one of the Buddha's main disciples and his cousin, was called upon to recite the discourses and Abhidhamma of the Buddha, and Upali, another disciple, recited the rules of the vinaya. These became the basis of the Tripitaka (Three Baskets), which is preserved only in Pali. Actual record on the first Buddhist Council did not mention the existence of the Abhidhamma. It existed only after the second Council.

The second Buddhist council was held at Vaisali following a dispute that had arisen in the Sangha over a relaxation by some monks of various points of discipline. Eventually it was decided to hold a second council at which the original Vinaya texts that had been preserved at
the first Council were cited to show that these relaxations went against the recorded teachings of the Buddha.

The Maurya Empire under Emperor Asoka was the world's first major Buddhist state. It established free hospitals and free education and promoted human rights. Asoka (273–232 BC) converted to Buddhism after his bloody conquest of the territory of Kalinga during the Kalinga War. Regretting the horrors and misery brought about by the conflict, the king magnanimously decided to renounce violence, to replace the misery caused by war with respect and dignity for all humanity. He propagated the faith by buildings stupas and pillars urging, amongst other things, respect of all animal life and enjoining people to follow the Dharma. Perhaps the finest example of these is the Great Stupa of Sanchi, near Bhopal. It was constructed in the 3rd century BC and later enlarged. Its carved gates, called toranas, are considered among the finest examples of Buddhist art in India. He also built roads, hospitals, rest houses, universities and irrigation systems around the country. He treated his subjects as equals regardless of their religion, politics or caste. This period marks the first spread of Buddhism beyond India to other countries. According to the plates and pillars left by Asoka, emissaries were sent to various countries in order to spread Buddhism, as far south as Sri Lanka and as far west as the Greek kingdoms, in particular the neighboring Greco-Bactrian Kingdom, and possibly even farther to the Mediterranean. King Asoka convened the third Buddhist council around 250 BC at Pataliputra (today's Patna). It was held by the monk Moggaliputtatissa. The objective of the council was to purify the Sangha, particularly from non-Buddhist ascetics who had been attracted by the royal patronage. Following the council, Buddhist missionaries were dispatched throughout the known world.

**Four noble truths or Aryasatya**

1. Life is suffering;

2. Suffering is due to attachment;

3. Attachment can be overcome;

4. There is a path for accomplishing this.
1. Suffering is perhaps the most common translation for the Sanskrit word duhkha, which can also be translated as imperfect, stressful, or filled with anguish. Contributing to the anguish is anitya -- the fact that all things are impermanent, including living things like us. Furthermore, there is the concept of anatman -- literally, "no soul". Anatman means that all things are interconnected and interdependent, so that nothing -- including ourselves -- has a separate existence.

2. Attachment is a common translation for the word trishna, which literally means thirst and is also translated as desire, clinging, greed, craving, or lust. Because we and the world are imperfect, impermanent, and not separate, we are forever "clinging" to things, each other, and ourselves, in a mistaken effort at permanence. Besides trishna, there is dvesha, which means avoidance or hatred. Hatred is its own kind of clinging. And finally there is avidya, ignorance or the refusal to see. Not fully understanding the impermanence of things is what leads us to cling in the first place.

3. Perhaps the most misunderstood term in Buddhism is the one which refers to the overcoming of attachment: nirvana. It literally means "blowing out," but is often thought to refer to either a Buddhist heaven or complete nothingness. Actually, it refers to the letting go of clinging, hatred, and ignorance, and the full acceptance of imperfection, impermanence, and interconnectedness.

4. And then there is the path, called dharma. Buddha called it the middle way, which is understood as meaning the middle way between such competing philosophies as materialism and idealism, or hedonism and asceticism. This path, this middle way, is elaborated as the eightfold path.

**The Eightfold Path or Astangamarga**

1. **Right view** is the true understanding of the four noble truths.
2. **Right aspiration** is the true desire to free oneself from attachment, ignorance, and hatefulness. These two are referred to as prajna, or wisdom.
3. **Right speech** involves abstaining from lying, gossiping, or hurtful talk.

4. **Right action** involves abstaining from hurtful behaviors, such as killing, stealing, and careless sex.

5. **Right livelihood** means making your living in such a way as to avoid dishonesty and hurting others, including animals. These three are referred to as *shila*, or morality.

6. **Right effort** is a matter of exerting oneself in regards to the content of one's mind: Bad qualities should be abandoned and prevented from arising again; Good qualities should be enacted and nurtured.

7. **Right mindfulness** is the focusing of one's attention on one's body, feelings, thoughts, and consciousness in such a way as to overcome craving, hatred, and ignorance.

8. **Right concentration** is meditating in such a way as to progressively realize a true understanding of imperfection, impermanence, and non-separateness. The last three are known as *samadhi*, or meditation.

**Pratityasamutpada**

The doctrine of Pratityasamutpada or Dependent Origination is the foundation of all the teachings of the Buddha. It is contained in the Second Noble Truth which gives us the cause of suffering, and in the Third Noble Truth which shows the cessation of suffering. Suffering in Samsara; cessation of suffering is Nirvana. Both are only aspects of the same Reality. Pratityasamutpada, viewed from the point of view of relativity is Samsara; while viewed from the point of view of reality, it is Nirvana. It is relativity and dependent causation as well as the absolute, for it is the Absolute itself which appears as relative and acts as the binding thread giving then unity and meaning. Everything is relative, conditional, dependent, subject to birth and death and therefore impermanent. The causal formula is 'This being, that arises', i.e., 'Depending on the cause, the effect arises'. Thus every object of thought in necessarily relative, and because it is relative, it is neither absolutely real (for it is subject to death) nor absolutely unreal (for it appears to arise). All Phenomenal things hang between reality and nothingness, avoiding both the extremes. Buddha identifies it with the Bodhi, the Enlightenment which dawned upon him under the shade of the bo tree in Gaya and which transformed the mortal Siddharta into the immortal Buddha. He also identifies it with the Dharma, the Law: 'He who
sees the pratityasamutpada sees the Dharma, and he who sees the Dharma sees Pratityasamutpada. Failure to grasp it is the cause of misery. Its knowledge leads to cessation of misery. Nagarjuna salutes Buddha as the best among the teachers, who taught the blessed doctrine of Pratityasamutpada which leads to the cessation of Plurality and to bliss.

Buddhism is divided into two important sects - Heenayana and Mahayana. Heenayana, like Jainism, is a religion without God, Karma taking the place of God. Heenayana emphasises liberation for and by the individual himself. It is the difficult part of self-help. Mahayana, the Great Vehicle, the Big Ship, which can accommodate a much larger number of people and can safely and securely take them to the shore of Nirvana from the troubled waters of the ocean of Samsara. Buddhism, though primarily an ethical-religious movements thus came to give birth to about thirty schools, not counting the minor one. And some of these get into the deep waters of metaphysical speculation, heedless of the founder's warning. Of these many schools we shall first notice the four distinguished in India by Buddhist and non-Buddhist writers. In this account, (1) some Buddha philosophers are nihilists (Madhyamikas), (2) others are subjective idealists (Yogacara), (3) others again are representationalists or critical realists (Sautrantika), and (4) the rest are direct realists (Vaibhasika). The first two of the above four schools come under Mahayana and the last two under Heenayana. It should be noted, however, that under both Mahayana and Heenayana there are many other schools.